Community Engagement in Strengthening Neighbourhood Initiatives

MPA Research Report

Submitted to

The Local Government Program
Department of Political Science
The University of Western Ontario

D.L. Bumstead
July 2010
Abstract

The plight of neighbourhoods in today's society is viewed with increasing concern. In Canada, the shrinking social safety net and the influx of immigrants so demanded in an aging demographic, has contributed to concentrated poverty in neighbourhood households (Gertler 22). The result - the poor find themselves living in very poor neighbourhoods (ibid). This neighbourhood issue transcends geography as cities in (particularly) western countries face the same dilemma (Pomeroy 2). The sustainable effective solution involves the engagement of neighbourhood or community residents. What components or processes of engagement are necessary for engagement to be successful? An overview of community engagement processes in select neighbourhoods inside and outside Canada follows while resident engagement in the City of London, Ontario's Strengthening Neighbourhood Strategy is specifically examined. All cases studied (that were acknowledged to use community engagement effectively in strengthening neighbourhood initiatives) attempted to involve citizens at the citizen power stage of Sherry Arnstein's Ladder of Citizen Participation. This means power was shared and participation genuine. Successful cases overall use fair and competent (or efficient) community engagement components in their treatment of residents through the community engagement process. The import of these individual components: representativeness, democracy, influence, transparency and competence or efficiency varies depending on the needs and composition of the particular neighbourhood in question.
# Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction .................................................. 4

Chapter 2: The Research Question ........................................ 6

Chapter 3: Research Methodology ........................................ 6

Chapter 4: Conceptual Framework ........................................ 7

Chapter 5: Strengthening Neighbourhoods and Community Engagement Outside Canada ........................................... 11

Chapter 6: Strengthening Neighbourhoods and Community Engagement in Canada ........................................... 21

Chapter 7: London Case Study ............................................. 28

Chapter 8: Implications and Policy Recommendations .................. 40

Chapter 9: Conclusion ..................................................... 42

Works Cited ................................................................. 44

Appendix 1 – Map of City of London Neighbourhoods ................. 50
Appendix 2 – City of London Staff Survey ................................ 51
Appendix 3 – Resident Task Force Survey ................................. 54

Table 1: Arnstein’s Ladder of Citizen Participation ...................... 11
Community Engagement in Strengthening Neighbourhood Initiatives

Introduction

Community or public engagement may be the local public administrators’ new buzz word. Previously considered a realm consigned to city planners, more and more municipal departments are collaborating and working together to involve the community in the search for solutions to municipal issues (Simpson 1). The province of New Brunswick even recently created a new position: the Minister of Public Engagement (Office of the Premier). What are these municipal issues? In 2004, a United Way and Canadian Council on Social Development report found an increase in concentrated poverty in neighbourhoods (ibid). By the year 2000, Canada possessed at least 291 high poverty neighbourhoods and that number was expanding (Torjman 8). Twenty-three percent of city residents in Canada earn incomes below the Low Income Cut-Off (Toronto City Summit Alliance 10). What does this mean? Poverty is no longer widely dispersed; it is condensed in single neighbourhoods (Dale). Community based social services have not kept pace with the increasing poverty (Toronto City Summit Alliance 11). The Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation found 1.5 million Canadians are in need of core housing (Federation of Canadian Municipalities 37). Yet the issue does not only afflict Canada. Sweden has recently begun area or neighbourhood based initiatives to remedy similar problems (Fröding 322). Fröding, a Swedish researcher, notes the issue of public health in Sweden is not judged to be as important as infrastructure (325). A sentiment many would say is echoed in Canada. Why care about neighbourhoods? Ellaway et al. found a significant association between, “psychological sense of community, perceived neighbourhood social cohesion and mental health outcomes” (Witten, McCleanor and Kearns 322). When working well a neighbourhood provides, “access to services and amenities, opportunities for social and community participation and a place of connection and attachment” (Witten, McCleanor and Kearns 321). A recent series of Hamilton Spectator articles covered a McMaster University
research teams’ findings showing that where one lives can affect one’s life expectancy (Buist). Health is influenced by social determinants such as social support networks, income, early childhood development and education (ibid). The McMaster research found a 21 year life expectancy difference between the richest and poorest neighbourhoods in Hamilton, Ontario (ibid). Neighbourhoods with low median incomes, higher dropout rates and people living below the poverty line possessed no family doctor, high rates of emergency visits and psychiatric emergencies (Buist).

Global strategies to strengthen neighbourhoods simultaneously recognize community engagement as a key factor in success (Simpson 1; Kellett, Peter and Moore 162; Pomeroy 4; “Cities and Communities that Work” 9). The United States, for instance has attempted numerous different approaches to neighbourhood revitalization (known as strengthening neighbourhoods in Canada) since the 1960’s (Simpson 2). Steve Pomeroy assessed American revitalization programs and found many such programs of the 1960’s, such as Johnson’s War on Poverty Economic Opportunity Act, floundered due to a lack of community engagement (and intergovernmental conflict) (Pomeroy 4). Countries worldwide have started to note that a more participative neighbourhood approach spreads out risk and increases financial resources (Fröding 322). Community engagement is increasingly used in Canada to target challenges of decaying neighbourhoods (“Government and Communities” 3). Researchers concede each neighbourhood is different. Who knows the neighbourhood better than residents? Including residents is one way to tackle resident apathy (Wilcox et al. 3). If residents are the owners of the ideas, apathy declines (ibid). When initiatives or external agencies leave, resident leaders (and residents) remain (“Final Reflections” 14). Therefore residents are left to carry on these new initiatives and programs. They can not carry on these new initiatives, or are less likely to be successful doing so if they are not included in the revitalization program originally. London, Ontario recently initiated a community engagement process called the London Strengthening Neighbourhood Strategy (LSNS) (“Report”, June 22/09). The Taskforce began meeting in November 2008

**The Research Question**

The London Strengthening Neighbourhood Strategy engagement process will be examined in detail in the context of a framework composed of Arnstein and Rowe and Frewer’s ideas on community engagement. Neighbourhood community engagement case studies from Western Europe, the United States and Canada will be compared and analyzed through the same lens, albeit less intensively. Implications of findings will be discussed. Specifically the question under interrogation is the following: Which components of community engagement are critical in ensuring public policy designed to strengthen neighbourhoods is effective? As each neighbourhood is different the definition of effective will vary in the context of the initiative under study. For some initiatives effectiveness of community engagement is measured by achievement of strategy. For others recruitment and participation of marginalized communities denotes effectiveness.

**Research Methodology**

Two brief surveys were administered to both staff members involved in the London Strengthening Neighbourhood Strategy (LSNS) and residents. The researcher emailed staff members individually to request completion of the online survey. Follow up emails were sent twice to all staff. The sample size was 23. One staff member had left her position with the City and was not pursued. Including this drop-out, the response rate was 65%.

Surveying residents proved more difficult. Due to time, cost, response rate concerns and difficulty tracking individual resident’s mailing addresses, a mail survey was not completed. Fortunately London City staff agreed to send the researcher’s survey once to LSNS Task Force
participants. The researcher realizes City staff emailing the survey introduces some bias into the process and reduces validity. Unfortunately follow-up emails could not be sent. As such the response rate for residents was low at 13%.

In order to clarify responses and attain information needed to classify and analyze the LSNS community engagement experience properly, an email follow-up questionnaire was sent to one of the City staff closely engaged in LSNS. Supplemental information also derived from review of Community and Protective Service Committee minutes from January 2008 to May 2010, the LSNS Resident Task Force Five Year Strategy and Implementation Report, the Neighbourhood Assessment Final Report, the City of London website and the archives for the two local city newspapers, the Londoner and the London Free Press.

**Conceptual Framework**

Case studies will be examined in light of a combined conceptual framework derived from Gene Rowe and Lynn Frewer’s Typology of Public Engagement Mechanisms and Sherry Arnstein’s Ladder of Citizen Participation (Rowe and Frewer 251; Arnstein 2). First; however, key terms will be defined. Strengthening neighbourhoods is a term synonymous with neighbourhood revitalization or neighbourhood renewal. Such terms are often used interchangeably in the academic literature and vary depending on country of examination (Pomeroy 1-2). Caledon Institute of Social Policy researcher, Steve Pomeroy states strengthening neighbourhoods is a process of significant socioeconomic change (2). The focus is “removing and replacing negative images” (ibid). The term denotes a citizen participation element (Pomeroy 4). Strengthening neighbourhoods is place-based and involves work across a wide breadth of issues (Leviten-Reid 3). It combines an urban planning approach with building a strong community (Simpson 1). The place-based approach denotes not only a geographic interest but the manner in which various factors (social, economic, etc.) combine in that area to determine the “quality of life” of that particular place (ibid). “Any sustained effort to increase the
connectedness, active engagement and participation among members of the community, community groups and organizations in order to enhance social, economic or environmental objectives” is Australian author Considine’s definition of the concept of strengthening neighbourhoods (Jope 2). Strengthening neighbourhood initiatives build community and capacity of individuals and organizations (ibid). They rely on “local knowledge and local resources” (Jope 2). These are comprehensive community initiatives (ibid). The goal of strengthening neighbourhoods is (fairly) unilaterally to “promote resilience in order to build strong and healthy communities” (Torjman 1).

Community or public engagement is a broad term. Community engagement may range from consultation to co-production of goods (Fagotto and Fung 639). Community engagement refers to active participation in society where people take “control of circumstances that affect their lives” (Torjman 2). Interestingly people who “actively and meaningfully participate” are found to be happier and healthier (Torjman 3). Rowe and Frewer’s definition of community engagement will hold for the purposes of this paper. Rowe and Frewer believe public engagement involves three parts: public communication, public consultation and public participation (254). Public communication constitutes information flow from the exercise sponsor to the people (Rowe and Frewer 254). The engagement sponsor varies in the cases selected. In some cases government initiates and supports the community engagement process. In others a community organization or a collaboration of organizations does the work, or initiates and in some respects ‘oversees’ the engagement. Public consultation is the reverse; information flows from people to the sponsor in a process initiated by the sponsor (Rowe and Frewer 255). Public participation then is, “the practice of involving members of the public in the agenda-setting, decision-making and policy-framing activities of organizations or institutions responsible for policy development” (Rowe and Frewer 253).

Last, the definition of public policy derives from Leslie Pal’s standard definition. Public policy is “a course of action or inaction chosen by public authorities to address a given problem
or a given set of problems” (Westhues 8). In the context of this paper, the problem addressed particularly is that of strengthening neighbourhoods. Throughout the paper “public authorities” may seem to refer to government or community-based organizations as many organizations created policy which later achieved government approval. Some community organizations created their own policy or strategy which was then accepted by the public and enforced (or implemented) by the same individuals. Yet public policy is “a course of action or inaction” chosen or approved “by public authorities” (meaning government) not neighbourhood associations or community organizations.

The variables Rowe and Frewer use in their typology to analyze the effectiveness of public engagement compose part of the conceptual framework. Basically all community engagement can be analyzed, according to the authors, by its fairness and competence or efficiency (Rowe and Frewer 262). Fairness refers to the democracy, representativeness, transparency, public acceptability and influence of the process (ibid). Democracy refers to the openness and accessibility of the process (266). Representativeness refers in some respects to the diversity of the participants – age, gender, race, etc. (262). Transparency questions whether the public can see what is really occurring and how decisions are being made (Jope 7). Public acceptability is similar to support for an initiative. It is impacted by cost effectiveness, clearly defined roles for participants, etc (Jope 7). Influence, drawing some from Arnstein, of the process may refer to the impact of the process, and may look at money, power and resources involved, etc. (Arnstein 10). Competence or efficiency refers to maximizing relevant information and transferring it with minimal information loss or “aggregating it into an accurate composite” (Rowe and Frewer 263). These variables will be used to analyze the cases chosen.

Next, Sherry Arnstein first published her ladder of citizen participation in 1969 in the Journal of American Institute and Planners (1). It is still used frequently today (ibid). Each level of the ladder is interspersed with two or three rungs (Arnstein 2). Citizen involvement increases as one proceeds to climb the ladder (ibid). At the bottom of the ladder is manipulation and
therapy (ibid). Manipulation means participation is geared toward the sponsor’s own means and ends (Arnstein 5). Therapy implies that the sponsor tries to change participant values for the benefit of the sponsor not the citizen (Arnstein 7). These rungs indicate citizen involvement at a nonparticipation level or stage (ibid). Participation is not genuine; it is based on perhaps biased or selfish stakeholder interests (ibid).

The next level of the ladder cites tokenism (ibid). The tokenism stage is delineated by informing, consultation and placation rungs (ibid). Informing occurs where communication is one way only. For instance, from the sponsor to the participant (Arnstein 7). Placation implies an ambiguous definition of citizen or participant rights and responsibilities (Arnstein 9). It also implies a reliance on traditional solutions, going through the motions, not actively listening to participants (ibid). It usually is typified by insufficient assistance and resources provided to participants alike (ibid). Consultation was defined previously. Information flows from people to the sponsor in a process initiated by the sponsor (Rowe and Frewer 255). Participants hear and “have a voice” at this level but they have no power (ibid).

At the top level of the ladder rests citizen power (ibid). The ladder rungs inset are partnership, delegated power and citizen control (ibid). Each rung offers the citizen higher levels of power and decision-making authority (ibid). In partnership resources are shared and ground rules are set collaboratively (Arnstein 11). Delegated power is self-defining save participants do not have a veto or final decision making authority (Arnstein 12). In the citizen control rung, the citizens plan, make policy, manage, the whole gamut (Arnstein 13).

The ladder is a type of classification system. Rowe and Frewer’s typology provides the analytical variables while Arnstein’s ladder provides the categorization. Rowe and Frewer’s variables feed into Arnstein’s categories. For instance, a community engagement process with undemocratic, inefficient, opaque (as opposed to transparent messaging) characteristics is likely to be non-participative and thus manipulative (Arnstein 4). Rowe and Frewer’s variables help identify the appropriate Arnstein classification stage or level. Arnstein’s classification separates
various engagement processes (overall) into appropriate categories. Classification aids in comprehension of community engagement type.

**Table One:** Arnstein’s Ladder of Citizen Participation

![Arnstein's Ladder of Citizen Participation](image)


**Strengthening Neighbourhoods and Community Engagement Outside Canada**

The variety of academic research covering pilot projects and programs for strengthening neighbourhood initiatives abound. Some explain how community engagement failed (Davies 207). Others explain how the overall initiative itself failed or was unsustainable (Stelman). The case studies selected here were so selected because they provide at least partially sufficient detail to analyze the community engagement piece of the strengthening neighbourhood initiative. No
community engagement process is exactly the same and case studies from different areas of the western world were selected: Australia, U.S., and Europe. The two Canadian case studies selected were selected on a geographic basis, as they take place in Ontario and generally under the same governmental structure as the LSNS. Cases are generally analyzed up to the early stages of implementation of strategy and programming. This coincides with the timing of the LSNS which is currently in the early stages of implementation. Each case will briefly be qualitatively reviewed based on the conceptual framework.

The first case study revolves around the Joseph Rowntree Foundation (JRF) in the U.K. JRF claims 40 years experience with neighbourhood initiatives in England (Taylor 2). JRF’s Neighbourhood Programme was initiated in 2002 and was based on JRF’s own academic research (Taylor 13). The JRF Neighbourhood Programme selected 20 neighbourhoods to target in England, Scotland and Wales and used community based organizations to funnel their strengthening neighbourhood expertise (Taylor 2). JRF used a “light touch” providing these organizations with access to information, support and facilitation with an assigned JRF facilitator and a small amount of funding (Taylor 2). Organizations listed facets needed in their neighbourhoods in order to attain JRF funding and resource assistance (Taylor 19). These organizations had not completed neighbourhood needs assessments or such evaluations previously (ibid). JRF selected organizations based on their geography, diverse neighbourhoods and the recommendation of other organizations (Taylor 15-16). (JRF suggested upon reflection instituting a new process for selection in the future) (ibid). Following selection, organizations needed to submit a strategic plan for their neighbourhood (ibid). Hence each community engagement strengthening neighbourhood process was slightly different depending on the needs of the neighbourhood. Many had no experience with strategic planning before linking with the JRF (ibid). Many of these organizations struggled in undertaking community engagement, leaving their efforts to engage at the tokenism stage, specifically the informing or consulting rung where communication is one way only (Arnstein 2, 7). They found themselves basically
informing citizens and government and carrying out their program – not engaging citizens. This could partly be due to capacity as organizations had few paid staff or were completely volunteer-run (Taylor 15). Many were fragile and dependent or based on one or two people (Taylor 22). Many therefore, found it difficult and overwhelming to engage further residents. This thus reduced the democracy of the engagement (Taylor 19). As some of these organizations became more professional they tended to lose touch with residents as well and the number of residents participating in the community engagement declined (Taylor 23).

Many of these organizations’ community engagement and strategic plans involved working with local governments (Taylor 43). Various organizations’ relationships with government were complicated. Most struggled to be heard by government (Arnstein 4). For example, smaller organizations in disadvantaged areas found they were not considered a priority by local government and thus could not access developmental resources (Taylor 43). The JRF found that the organization must be seen as being representative of the community for local government to respond to it (ibid). JRF found personality conflicts, staff turnover, and the pace of policy change can all affect this relationship and thus the competency and efficacy of relationships between local government and community organizations (Taylor 36). Often; however, these community organizations felt marginalized by city authorities in their grassroots planning efforts (Taylor 30). As per the conceptual framework then, public acceptability in the form of council responsiveness was reduced when an organization, due to size was not considered representative. This in turn affected the organizations influence (and access to resources).

Eventually some organizations tried to increase democracy and form partnerships to approach segregated cultures (Taylor 33–38). Arnstein pinpoints several blocks to full participation in her writing, one of which is racism (5). JRF found it took a long time to bridge the divide between races in some neighbourhoods (Taylor 36). In others, the racial divide was never bridged and a separate facility made for the different community (ibid). Rowe and Frewer understand representativeness is key to effective public engagement. JRF organizations then
struggled with this variable. This in turn continued to affect not only council acceptability but general public acceptability of the community engagement process.

Competence and efficiency is another Rowe and Frewer variable for classifying public engagement (262). Time, although not identified here as a separate engagement component (that can influence the effectiveness of strengthening neighbourhood policy), seems to fall under efficiency as a sub-component. Many of the JRF organizations were successful (Three organizations did fail according to JRF’s Programme Evaluation) in completing their agendas (Taylor 70). Yet not in the original one year time period allocated. The JRF extended the life of the programme by one year because it took so long for organizations to build capacity and make progress (Taylor 17). Proceeding further, organizations found the support of the JRF facilitator vital to give them the confidence to recruit volunteers and engage the community, thus enhancing competence (Taylor 77). Many organizations said the use of JRF’s name helped them broker deals with local authorities, business, etc (Taylor 66). Thus the reputation or influence of JRF influenced the competence of the community engagement process. Competence was affected by money as well. Organizations found they needed more money to reach more people (ibid). Thus money affected competency and information transmission. Often staff obsessed with meeting funding priorities (Taylor 19). Thus staff issues occasionally threatened to (and did) distract organizations from focusing on engaging the public (Taylor 19). Thus this struggle with money and timing reduced competence as staff or volunteer time and effort was focused on areas other than engagement. Staff did not have enough time to effectively commit to bridge racial divides.

In summing up JRF’s community engagement experience JRF organizations found that city government can be a stumbling block or an obstacle to implementation of community organization’s policy (or moving from community policy to public policy) but influence and representativeness can play a part in dismantling this obstacle (Taylor 38). JRF organizations tended to use mainly public communication or public consultation as their engagement mechanism. Thus, they land on the informing rung of the tokenism stage of Arnstein’s ladder.
Communication is one way (ibid). Many found they needed more resources, specifically time and money to be effective. Money shortfalls partly affected influence and access to resources (and outreach to further communities) which thus influenced the achievement of plans. These factors affected public acceptability (as public officials preferred to deal with larger and more representative organizations) overall and some organizations’ competency.

Moving now across the Atlantic, the United States has piloted several different options in their attempts to solve neighbourhood revitalization problems ("Place-based Public Policy" 22). Fagotto and Fung studied the approach Minneapolis used in the 1990’s. A Task Force and council determined a $400 million investment over 20 years via empowering residents would be cheaper then the $3 billion estimated to implement Task Force proposals (Fagotto and Fung 639-640). Five jurisdictions governed the plan: City of Minneapolis, Minneapolis Public Schools, Hennepin County, Minneapolis Parks and Recreation and Minneapolis Public Library (Fagotto and Fung 641). Neighbourhood associations were mandated to show the head Neighbourhood Revitalization Programme office (newly staffed with a director and 10 staff) how they planned to involve diverse residents in their community revitalization projects (Fagotto and Fung 641-2). The main office then approved or disapproved the plans (ibid). Neighbourhood associations canvassed, mailed surveys or held neighbourhood meetings to identify resident issues and needed actions (ibid). This process and final City approval of the plan took approximately three years (Fagotto and Fung 642).

Returning to the conceptual framework this model appears to share power between citizens and power-holders. Shared power and decision making is typical of Arnstein’s partnership rung (11). Residents sat on committees that oversaw implementation and volunteered with relevant revitalization projects such as neighbourhood clean-ups (ibid). Volunteers negotiated with planners (ibid). Thus planning committees appear to meet this shared power criteria (Fagotto and Fung 642). Citizens also had some support via staff and some power in allocating funds - tax increment funds financed the program (Fagotto and Fung 641). These
outcomes are typified in the citizen power stage (Arnstein 4). This also speaks some to the influence of citizens in the public engagement process. Influence is most dominant in Arnstein’s partnership rung as engagement, which, “can work most effectively where there is an organized power-base in the community to which the citizen leaders are accountable; …when the group has the resources to hire (and fire) its own technicians” (11). Minneapolis residents’ neighbourhood associations were required to incorporate into non profit organizations (Fagotto and Fung 641). Thus residents did possess some kind of an organized power base and were accountable to the newly incorporated body and the NRP office (ibid). Although there is no evidence that Minneapolis residents held the power to hire and fire staff as identified by Arnstein, citizens had bargaining power with the City (11). Fung found residents felt more of an equal playing field existed (Fagotto and Fung 643). Yet, as with the JRF model, despite the new power sharing relationships with local government, this resident-local government relationship and thus resident influence still fluctuated depending on the department, council or individual in question (Fagotto and Fung 642).

It appeared the Minneapolis Neighbourhood Revitalization Program attempted to reach anyone (It was inclusive and thus democratic) (Fagotto and Fung 641-2). Neighbourhood associations were required to create a plan to reach diverse resident populations (ibid). It is uncertain if associations were held accountable to this. As for the actual representativeness of the program, the homeowner and white majority apparently dominated participation (644). Fagotto and Fung note participation from residents at most risk increased over time (644). This is perhaps an indication that trust takes longer to develop for these individuals. This early lack of representation did affect the competence and efficiency of the program as homeowners and service organizations clashed. Service organizations argued for more subsidized housing; homeowners disagreed (Fagotto and Fung 645). As well, resident information was not translated into different languages further decreasing representativeness (Fagotto and Fung 647). In terms of competence; however, an outcome from the program was better staffing and efficiency in pre-
existing community organizations (Fagotto and Fung 651). Organizations experienced increased capacity. The Minneapolis project was publicly acceptable, as it obtained City hall approval (Fagotto and Fung 641). The transparency of the plan is a bit muddy. The NRP office needed to approve it, but it is unclear how much of the final plan needed to be communicated to residents. One might assume that overall with 1,675 residents on working committees and 12,585 participating in 93 meetings across the city the plan was fairly transparent (Fagotto and Fung 644).

Thus the conceptual framework would probably situate community engagement in the Minneapolis Neighbourhood Revitalization Plan on rung 6 (Partnership) or 7 (Delegated Power) of 8 in the citizen power zone (Arnstein 4). Delegated power is typified by delegated citizen veto or dominant decision making authority (Arnstein 13). Since the NRP office could approve or disprove plans and the citizens had no veto, the engagement does not meet all criteria for the delegated power level (Fagotto and Fung 641). Effectiveness here is recognized by incorporation, adoption of the plan by the MNP office and successful implementation of it.

Findings from this case demonstrate that shared citizen power – engagement where citizens share in agenda-setting and policy formation – can be effective and competent. The process takes time. City approval took almost three years and more diverse representation and participation took even longer (Fagotto and Fung 642 and 644). But approval and more diverse representation did transpire; thus the case shows the relative importance of continued transparency and open engagement between the city and the NRP and committees in their shared power processes.

Another cross-ocean example demonstrates the strategy and intensive efforts required to engage marginalized members of the community in the public engagement process of strengthening community. Sally Jope, Social Action and Research Associate of the Brotherhood of St. Laurence, an “influencing organization” in Australia, reviewed a citizen jury model panel that deliberately attempted to engage indigenous Australians and non-English speakers
(Brotherhood of St. Laurence). The panel is called the Victoria Southern Region Citizen’s Panel (Jope 5). Participants for the panel were randomly selected from the Office of Housing (Jope 8). To recruit these participants, the organizers used media and distributed information on juries to all residents in the neighbourhood to increase response (Jope 8). The organizers required 12–20 people per jury. Organizers still had to call residents and recruit over the phone to attain sufficient membership in the panel (ibid). In order to adequately include the marginalized communities, the organizers supplied transportation to meetings, interpreters and childcare (Jope 9).

The Victoria Southern Region Citizen’s Panel managed to overcome many of the limitations Arnstein outlines in her typology: futility, alienation and distrust (5). The organizers recruited inclusively and maximized democracy and representativeness by talking to residents directly to recruit (Jope 8). This decreased futility. They tried to increase the fairness of the engagement process by providing equal accessibility to the experience in the form of transportation and interpreters (Jope 9). This reduced alienation. Rowe and Frewer consider citizen panels more consultative than participative (Rowe and Frewer 277). The jury method itself is more placative or tokenistic on Arnstein’s ladder (Arnstein 9). Citizens have some level of influence on a jury but they are not “accountable to a constituency” (ibid). The Housing authority has the power to judge their advice and decide to implement it or not (Jope 7). Basically the jury process involves groups meeting to discuss a question or charge put to them (Jope 7). Victoria Citizen Panel meetings were facilitated by organizers (ibid). Groups could request further information (ibid). They then made recommendations to the Office of Housing (ibid). Overall the process of soliciting engagement, however; was democratic and open, representative, and competent in that participants said they were inspired to volunteer more, one to obtain employment and others remarked of increased self-esteem (Jope 8). As for efficiency, resource-wise this was a more time consuming and resource intensive process, as organizers needed to drive residents to meetings, contact them by phone to recruit them and obtain childcare.
Effectiveness of this engagement case can be measured by impact on participants and representativeness of indigenous populations in the engagement. One key finding from this case is the demonstration that diverse representation of marginalized populations in one’s community engagement process is possible - although it may take more effort, more time and more creativity. It is instructive to see the additional benefits and outcomes of open, democratic engagement processes to the participants. These representative participants also produced competent efficient and effective results.

A last distinct model of community engagement and strengthening neighbourhoods from outside Canada belongs to the United States. The Dudley Street neighbourhood was characterized as the poorest part of Boston (Pomeroy 18). Large parcels of vacant land engulfed the area (ibid). It ensconced a culturally diverse population of majority African Americans, Cape Verdeans, Latinos and minority Whites (“History”). The area was “devastated by arson, disinvestment neglect, and redlining practices” (Medoff and Sklar 1). Per capita income was half that of the city of Boston (ibid). Approximately 32% of the neighbourhood lived below the poverty line (ibid). Approximately 24,000 residents lived in the neighbourhood (Pomeroy 19). The Riley Foundation assisted the neighbourhood with initial start-up funds and core funding (Pomeroy 20). The Foundation first entered the neighbourhood on the request of La Alianza Hispana community organization (Medoff and Sklar 38). The Foundation saw the devastation of the area and quickly decided to invest resources (Medoff and Sklar 42). A 23 member governing board was quickly made and consisted of four community members from core areas (Black, Cape Verdean, Hispanic, White); five nonprofit agencies from the health and human service fields; two other nonprofit organizations; two representatives each from small businesses, the broader religious community, community development corporations; one official from the City and state and two others to further reflect or “enhance the racial/ethnic/age/ sex representation, skills or resources” (Medoff and Sklar 49). Two hundred residents attended the first community meeting which offered headphones for simultaneous translation (Medoff and Sklar 56). Residents were angered
during the meeting because they felt the advisory group did not reflect or represent actual residents (Medoff and Sklar 53). In fact only one member of the governing board actually lived in the neighbourhood (ibid). At the next meeting a new governing structure was realized; a 31 member board with majority resident participation (Medoff and Sklar 57). The four major cultures of Dudley Street were given equal representation (Medoff and Sklar 57). The Riley Foundation had no seat on the board (ibid). In 1984 the board established the Dudley Street Neighbourhood Initiative (DSNI) (ibid). Organizing residents collaborated with area residents to create a community plan (ibid). The plan focused on improving employment skills, housing, and developing community pride (Pomeroy 19). The DSNI convinced the City of Boston to give the group the power of eminent domain over the 1,300 parcels of abandoned land in the area (ibid). In 1987 the City of Boston adopted the DSNI plan as their official plan (“History”). The plan was updated with 180 residents and many organizational representatives in 1996 (ibid). Since this time the DSNI has collaborated with churches, nonprofit organizations, business and over 2,700 residents to implement the plan (ibid). DSNI’s public acceptability flourished as the Ford Foundation and the federal Community Development Block Grant helped fund training programs and housing renovation activities (ibid).

At the peak of Arnstein’s ladder of citizen participation is citizen control (13). It is characterized by citizens or residents governing a program, “in full charge of policy and managerial aspects”, without intermediaries between it and the source of funds (ibid). The DSNI fits this description. All members of the community were represented equally (Medoff and Sklar 57). Interpretation was provided at community meetings (Medoff and Sklar 56). From the start of the first meeting the original board was transparent and members sought what was best for the community not their own agenda (Medoff and Sklar 57). Initial transparency and democracy led to increased representativeness which affected the effectiveness of engagement. This encouraged trust and full participation of residents (ibid). In the researchers’ opinion, the early support of the Riley Foundation affected the ability of the board to influence untrusting members of the
community who had seen ideas come and go before. It hence affected the competence and efficacy of the initiative. Effectiveness can be determined here by diverse groups working together and successfully leading and controlling new implementation initiatives in their neighbourhood.

In conclusion, representativeness, and transparency early on affected public acceptability and trust and led to engagement effectiveness. Shared power and influence (the availability of financial assistance) were possibly critical to the process working on Dudley Street.

**Strengthening Neighbourhoods and Community Engagement in Canada**

Canadian strengthening neighbourhood initiatives have expanded over the last five years. Organizations, such as the United Way, and Tamarack Institute for Social Engagement particularly seem to have taken the lead in focusing on the strengthening neighbourhood challenge in Canada. One example of this participation arose in 2005 when Tamarack, the National Film Board of Canada, the United Way of Canada-Centraide Canada and the Caledon Institute of Social Policy partnered to pilot Anticipating Neighbourhood Change (ANC) (“Governments and Communities” 5). Five neighbourhoods across Canada participated in ANC (ibid). ANC neighbourhoods had 26 months to implement an asset-based, resident-led process (“Final Reflections” 7). Bridgeview (Surrey), North Central/Core (Regina), Simpson-Ogden (Thunder Bay), Scarborough Village (Toronto), Spryfield (Halifax) make up the five selected neighbourhoods (“Final Reflections” 1). As an aside, shortly after onset the neighbourhoods initially believed they would only have 14 months instead of 26 to initiate engagement due to a change in federal government (“ANC in Thunder Bay” 1). Geographic location was given priority in selecting two ANC neighbourhood experiences to examine as cases for this paper. Scarborough Village, Toronto and Simpson-Ogden, Thunder Bay, both Ontario neighbourhoods

---

1 Tamarack Institute “develops and supports collaborative strategies that engage citizens and institutions to solve major community challenges, and to learn from and share these experiences” (“About Tamarack”)
were selected, as these communities ultimately report to the same provincial government as London, Ontario and share similar municipal regulations and limitations. ANC initiatives were selected for study instead of other Canadian initiatives as these incorporate a strong community engagement piece.

Simpson-Ogden, Thunder Bay is a neighbourhood with an aging and declining population (“Thunder Bay”). Employment is high; income is low (ibid). Simpson-Ogden sports a high percentage of Aboriginals and has a high rate of diabetes and related medical illnesses (ibid). The sex and drug trade were prevalent (ibid). Again the ANC project had a short two year timeline from 2005 – 2007 (ibid). Noteworthy is the fact Simpson-Ogden was selected for its pre-existing leadership and the probability that issues could be addressed in 14 months (“Gifts in Unexpected Places” 1). ANC started the campaign with a block party (“Gifts in Unexpected Places” 3). Four hundred residents attended (ibid). ANC opened an office on Simpson St., connected with Lakehead University and soon had 10 placement students leading focus groups, reviewing past neighbourhood proposals and researching substandard housing in the area (ibid). ANC opened an office in May and held the block party in July (ibid). The first meeting of block leaders, or residents with an interest in volunteering with ANC occurred after the block party (“Gifts in Unexpected Places” 4). There were soon 24 in the group (ibid). In October ANC met with local businesses and created some alliances and partnerships (“Gifts in Unexpected Places” 3). In January ANC produced an interim report based on 229 discussion group interviews and personal interviews (“Gifts in Unexpected Places” 4). Staff and volunteers delivered flyers door to door advertising an upcoming planning meeting (ibid). Sixty residents and 40 service providers attended, and out of this meeting and the aforesaid report, six priorities for the neighbourhood were set (ibid). Nominations for the Neighbourhood Action Committee (NAC) occurred at the meeting as well (ibid). The NAC established subcommittees for neighbourhood clean ups, by-law enforcement, neighbourhood lighting, and newsletters on child and wellness issues (“Thunder Bay”). By the end of the pilot the NAC was seeking incorporation (ibid). Their
policy validation group had met with the Mayor and Chief Administrative Officer where concerns were brought forward ("Gifts in Unexpected Places" 4).

Arnstein states, “a neighbourhood corporation with no intermediaries between it and the source of funds” fits the citizen control model (13). In the Simpson-Ogden example, the neighbourhood committee and ANC created their own priorities ("Gifts in Unexpected Places" 4). They selected which proposals received ANC grant money ("Thunder Bay"). They wrote their own constitution (ibid). If ANC is considered a member of the community, this example would fit the citizen control typology. If ANC is considered more of an intermediary, which is more likely, then citizen participation falls down the ladder from citizen control but still remains in the citizen power stage albeit more partnership-based (Arnstein 4). Dependence on an organization is dangerous as information, skill and energy losses can occur when the organization leaves (Taylor 70). Many community engagement initiatives, however; utilize community organizations as vehicles for participation. Sally Jope notes community service organizations, as they are called in Australia, can be a facilitator of participation (5). She believes community strengthening initiatives have two goals, they address local issues and involve and build capacity of the people surrounded by these issues (Jope 2). Thus both residents and organizations can build capacity when working together.

In assessing public participation through Rowe and Frewer’s typology, the Simpson-Ogden process appeared to be open to all (transparent and democratic). Information was distributed door to door indiscriminately ("Gifts in Unexpected Places" 4). Priorities arose from an open meeting (ibid). As for representativeness, it is uncertain whether all cultures were represented. There is no information on specific outreach attempts to the high Aboriginal population. And although the Elizabeth Fry Society did receive funding to aid women in crisis with the law, there is no evidence those in the drug trade were canvassed. In terms of transparency, a block party introduced ANC to the neighbourhood. The residents appear responsible for implementation plans ("Thunder Bay"). The United Way decided to allocate 2%
of its annual campaign to the neighbourhood post-2007 ("ANC in Thunder Bay” 2). The City also contributed $75 500 from their 2007 budget ("ANC in Thunder Bay” 2). Thus as both the City and the United Way are organizations dependent on public opinion, their investment would reflect some public acceptability of the program. In terms of competence and efficiency, neighbourhood clean ups now occur before the official clean up even begins ("ANC in Thunder Bay” 5). McConnell Foundation funding backed the creation of a youth strategy ("ANC in Thunder Bay” 4). The province and ANC funded 186 summer jobs in Simpson Ogden and 4-6 youth workers (ibid). Hence the NAC is becoming increasingly capable or competent at partnership building. Overall the process may be deemed effective.

In conclusion, Simpson-Ogden displayed astute competence in spreading their message. They used several vehicles: open meetings, celebrations and material distributed door to door. And these vehicles were democratic (open) and transparent without hidden agendas. ANC notes small wins build momentum, and this capability to make change via these small wins (grant making), and shared power and influence (resources) impacted the effectiveness of the initiative.

The second ANC initiative, Scarborough Village is characterized by 26 different spoken languages where 60% of its residents are born outside Canada ("Toronto"). The neighbourhood was underserviced and lacked strong community agencies ("ANC Begins in Scarborough” 2). The neighbourhood had no gym or swimming pool and poor bus service ("ANC Begins in Scarborough” 5). ANC opened their office in a strip mall one month prior to a teenage shooting in the area ("Scarborough Village Grows” 2). Forty-five “skeptics” attended the first resident forum in June (ibid). As ANC needed to work quickly in a short 14 month period, they hired a community development firm, Public Interest, to staff the office ("Toronto"). The firm hired nine individuals part-time to be animators (ibid). These individuals derived from the Urdu, Tamil, Bengali, Afro-Caribbean and youth community (ibid). These animators already had established networks and trust within their respective communities (ibid). ANC newsletters were created in multiple languages and delivered door to door ("Scarborough Village Grows” 2).
teen shooting ANC met with residents of the building where the violence had occurred to ask what could be done to make their neighbourhood feel safer (“Scarborough Village Grows” 3). Out of this discussion came the idea of an Agency Table (“Scarborough Village Grows” 3). An Agency Table provides one location or access point to several different community services (ibid). Different agencies rotate in and use ANC office space to provide services at different times (ibid). This permitted an increase in influence. ANC now had access to these other agencies’ resources as well. This in turn may have enhanced public acceptability. Continuing on, by November a Neighbourhood Action team was formed (“Scarborough Village Grows” 3). The team wrote their own constitution and directed ANC grants to cover equipment costs (“Scarborough Village Grows” 3-5). Equipment costs consisted of cricket equipment, a garden, a play structure, a dry pad for an arena to turn into an indoor sports surface, etc. (“Scarborough Village Sets a Good Example” 3). The purchase of the dry pad resulted from a partnership with the City (“Scarborough Village Sets a Good Example” 4-5). The City hired a part–time worker through Youthlink to coordinate youth recreational programs in the area (“Scarborough Village Sets a Good Example” 5). Two further youth workers were also hired and worked directly with the youth animator (ibid). A Scarborough Youth Council formed and more meeting space was established for youth (ibid). Staff note quick wins, such as allotting the $80,000 grant money early builds morale (“Scarborough Village Sets a Good Example” 2). Scarborough Village now has an after school program and language programs in various different languages (“Scarborough Village Sets a Good Example” 2). Meetings were facilitated for Pakistani women in the community to meet with councillors to discuss their safety concerns (“Scarborough Village Sets a Good Example” 3). This resulted in a safety audit (ibid). Organizers educated these women on the organization of municipal government before the meeting occurred (ibid). One thousand residents attended the first year celebration of operations (“Scarborough Village Sets a Good Example” 4). The community engagement initiative may be deemed effective.
Akin to the Simpson-Ogden example above ANC Scarborough worked largely outside the purview of municipal government. Discussions and partnerships did occur with local government around youth and safety issues (“Scarborough Village Sets a Good Example” 2-5). Most funding, priorities and capacity building arose from residents or the ANC office. In terms of democracy and efficiency information is translated into different languages. Animators reach out to their constituents to aid engagement. ANC did note a decline and subsequent cancellation of Farsi and Dari classes suggesting they did not perhaps reach out to this group as well as others (“Scarborough Village Sets a Good Example” 3). Obviously with 26 different spoken languages, the facilitators made concessions over which language/ cultures would be targeted, somewhat reducing fairness or democracy and representativeness of the experience (Rowe and Frewer 262). But meetings were open to all to attend (“Scarborough Village Grows” 3). A youth animator was hired as youth were identified early on as a priority for the neighbourhood (Rowe and Frewer 262). In terms of transparency, planning meetings were promoted door to door (“Scarborough Village Grows” 2). Further partner agencies joined – as a result of attending these meetings (Agency Table). A block party announced their success (“Scarborough Village Sets a Good Example” 4). The office was located in a visible area (“Scarborough Village Grows” 2). These factors helped the group gain public acceptability. The Toronto Strengthening Neighbourhood Task Force replicated the Scarborough Village model in four other Toronto priority neighbourhoods – another indicator of public acceptability (“Scarborough Village Sets a Good Example” 2). Partnerships with the City regarding recreation (dry pads) and youth programming indicate competence and efficiency of public engagement and the effective negotiation and transmission of neighbourhood needs. The Public Interest firm gained trust to the extent animators were concerned about future sustainability because the firm left after the two year contract ended (“Scarborough Village Sets a Good Example” 7). Thus this strengthening neighbourhood initiative would appear to be similar to Simpson-Ogden existing in the citizen power zone of Arnstein’s model (Arnstein 2). Scarborough Village highlights the fact that the
background and history of a neighbourhood may impact the importance of a community engagement component. Representativeness was crucial to the engagement’s credibility and effectiveness. It helped enhance competency and maximization of relevant information to marginalized groups. Representativeness helped build trust and open up marginalized communities.

Timing, although not a distinctive component of community engagement specifically measured here recurring arose as an item of process consideration. In the overall findings of the five ANC pilots, Cheryl Gorman, writing for the Caledon Institute of Social Policy, found neighbourhoods continue to need a system of support following the initial two year ANC community investment (“Final Reflections” 15). It took one to two years to engage and mobilize residents depending on the neighbourhood in question (“Final Reflections” 11). Eighteen months specifically was considered the minimum time needed to build resident led neighbourhood governance (“Final Reflections” 8). Thus timing affects the competency or efficiency of the engagement process. ANC associates found residents required skill training in areas such as organizing meetings, conflict resolution, communication, community animation and leadership (ibid). Forging relationships with local government was a critical success factor for the long-term success of the neighbourhood led initiative (“Final Reflections” 9). These findings on timing and complicated government relationships were supported by the cases noted here. In further comparing the case studies both internal and external to Canada one similarity of effective community engagement was that residents had power. They had power to make change. Community engagement here can be located above the tokenism stage of Arnstein’s ladder of citizen participation. Where neighbourhoods were built on diversity, such as the DSNI and Scarborough Village, representativeness and transparency (along with the dimension of power previously mentioned) are critical to community engagement’s effectiveness. Where diversity is less an issue, for instance in Minneapolis and Simpson-Ogden, influence (resources) and democracy and openness or transparency of the process are perhaps more important. One might
infer from this that different community engagement components carry more weight in different
neighbourhoods. This difference derives from the unique composition (history and diversity) of
the specific neighbourhood.

**London Case Study: Results and Data Analysis**

The London Strengthening Neighbourhood Strategy is a resident-led initiative to
strengthen London city neighbourhoods ("Agenda", Feb.). London took a city-wide strategic
approach to the problem of strengthening neighbourhoods (ibid). The Strategy included four
phases: first, creating a definition and vision of London neighbourhoods, second, developing a
neighbourhood assessment tool, third developing strategies and fourth, creating an
implementation plan ("Neighbourhood Assessment Final Report" 4). Originally 129 residents
applied to participate in the initiative ("Report", June). Approximately 90 residents formed the
Task Force (ibid). Resident participation dropped off due to natural selection. No screening took
place (June 18 email). The Task Force meetings began in November 2008 and met monthly until

Results of the data analysis will be examined through the same conceptual framework
used above, beginning with democracy. Democracy again speaks to the openness and
accessibility of the engagement process (Rowe and Frewer 262). Resident Task Force meetings
occurred from 5-9 p.m. on weeknights ("The heart and essence"). Viewing engagement from a
democratic lens, this timeframe reduces accessibility to all. It is difficult for night shift workers
or single working families to attend meetings consistently held at this time. Neither meeting
location, Civic Garden Complex nor the North London Optimist Community Centre are central
locations. North London is in the northeast area of the city. One bus route runs adjacent to the
location (London Transit). The Civic Garden Complex is in the southwest area of the city. Two
bus routes seem to run in proximity to the location (ibid). Residents would need to take more
than one bus to the location, from most neighbourhoods in the other three quadrants (London
Transit). Approximately 82% of respondents surveyed felt the process was accessible.

Suggested Resident Task Force (RTF) improvements from residents in the resident survey included a change of location and meeting time.

Continuing on with the democracy and openness of the process, the City did not involve community organizations nor neighbourhood associations in the LSNS with the exception of a few organizations, such as Block Parents and Boys’ and Girls’ Club. These organizations were polled for hard data to include as indicators in residents’ Neighbourhood Assessment Final Report (“Neighbourhood Assessment Final Report” 3). This raises concern for a possibly disconnected and disjointed implementation; community organizations were not a part of the issue discussion process yet are sourced as the lead responsible for 46 of 204 strategies (ibid). Community organizations are listed as required resources for more than half these same 204 strategies (ibid).

Accessibility and democracy often overlap or seem to co-relate with representativeness. For instance, the accessibility of the recruitment process often impacts the diversity of the community participating. The City of London recruited through local print media, alternative language newspapers, community associations, partner agencies, postcard distribution and the City website (“Report” Sept. 08). Postcards were translated into five languages (ibid). This appears to be a fairly accessible process aimed at generating full representation; the City planned to recruit from diverse cultures (ibid). Fourteen percent of residents heard about LSNS and the recruitment of volunteers through a community organization, another fourteen percent through a friend and twenty-nine percent through council or city staff. Of these same respondents 33% had volunteered with the City before, and 91% had volunteered with community organizations before. Many respondents had not volunteered with the City before, which may counter the common finding that it is always the same people volunteering in municipal politics. The process was thus fairly democratic and open to new players.
Continuing on with the representativeness community engagement component, twenty-five percent of residents surveyed self-reported being part of a minority group (visible minority or a person with a disability). One of the councillors present at the presentation of the implementation report commented on the lack of visible diversity in the LSNS at the CPSC Taskforce presentation meeting; however not all members were present (“Agenda” Feb.). The researcher counted approximately one-third of the Resident Task Force members present. According to Statistics Canada’s Community Profiles, 14% of Londoners are visible minorities (Statistics Canada). Blacks, Arabs and Latin Americans round out the top three visible minorities in London (ibid). These three groups combine to reflect 7% of the City of London’s population. Thus the city itself does not reflect a high degree of visible minority diversity (like Toronto or Vancouver). The languages of translation for the postcards match the spoken language of the largest minority groups in the city (Statistics Canada).

Another category of representativeness relates to the socioeconomic status of participants. Although several respondents skipped the question, 17% of Resident Task Force members stated their family income was below $30,000, 33% said their income was over $100,000 and 25% stated it ranged between $50,000 - $100,000. Statistics Canada Community Profiles put $67,018 as the median household income for all 2005 (ibid). From the small resident sample, however it is difficult to assume overall RTF representativeness. But in this sample it appears there was some variation of household income among the Task Force members.

Examining representativeness in more detail, according to February’s Community and Protective Services report, 27 neighbourhoods held representation on the LSNS (“Agenda” Feb.). The Assessment report, however; analyzes data for 30 neighbourhoods (“Neighbourhood Assessment Final Report” 41). Therefore three neighbourhoods were not represented on the LSNS Resident Task Force but were included in the Assessment Report (31). These neighbourhoods are Fox Hollow, River Bend and Talbot. All three communities are located in west London (“Neighbourhood Assessment Final Report” 67). Fox Hollow and River Bend are
both situated on the edge of the city’s boundaries (ibid). Of the 27 neighbourhoods represented on the LSNS, representation ranges from one member in Jackson and Fanshawe (“Agenda” Feb.) to 10 representatives in Medway (“Agenda” Feb.). Responses from 1,190 residents in total were collected for the LSNS (ibid). Task Force members collected these responses through additional interviews (“Neighbourhood Assessment Final Report” 8). Neighbourhoods with more Task Force participants generally also generated more supplemental responses (interviews) for their own neighbourhood (ibid). Several responses were obtained from residents in the unrepresented neighbourhoods by interviews of RTF members from other neighbourhoods, although the number of interviews was minimal (“Neighbourhood Assessment Final Report” 67, 79, 85). According to the City of London’s 2001 neighbourhood census these three unrepresented neighbourhoods are newly developed planning districts with lower populations (“Information about Talbot”; “Information about Fox Hollow”; “Information about River Bend”). More residents here own homes than average Londoners (ibid). Resident ethnicity is mainly Canadian, English, Scottish, Irish, and German in Talbot; Canadian, English, Scottish, Irish and Dutch in Fox Hollow and Canadian, English, Scottish, Irish and French in River Bend (ibid). These three areas were not the least active or proud according to the Neighbourhood Assessment tool the city created (46, 42-44). They do share low scores on the connectivity index and gateway index (“Neighbourhood Assessment Final Report” 58). Conversely Medway is one of the five most populated planning districts (“Information about Medway”). Its ethnic origins are English, Scottish, Irish, Canadian and German (ibid). Home ownership is 7 of 10 as opposed to 8 of 10 in Fox Hollow, Talbot and River Bend (ibid). Medway has a higher percentage of bus routes, 88.7% versus 0.0% in the three unrepresented areas, but its connectivity index is average and its gateway index also relatively low (“Neighbourhood Assessment Final Report” 58). Its pride is average (41). Its residents are averagely empowered and active on the City of London Assessment index (“Neighbourhood Assessment Final Report” 43 and 46). Lack of representation of these three areas can not be accrued to ethnicity or inactive citizens. The City attempted diverse and
representative recruiting but failed in gaining representation in these three areas. Resident Task Force survey data show some preliminary variance in socioeconomic status and minority representation on the Task Force. Unfortunately the low survey response rate and the lack of supplemental data do not permit a firm conclusive statement on overall representativeness (pertaining to socio-economic and minority status).

Public acceptability is the next part of the typology. It investigates whether the general public showed interest in LSNS. One way to measure this is to examine the number of media articles on the topic. The LSNS (after an archival search of key terms such as “strengthening neighbourhoods”, “Task Force” or “LSNS” in the London Free Press, the London daily paper) found no articles on the topic. A similar search of The Londoner, (a weekly newspaper) found one article advertising the start of the program and recruitment of participants (Londoner). Thus the media in London do not appear to have picked up on the topic. Subsequent advertisement of a May 25th, 2010 LSNS “Moving Forward” meeting (a meeting to discuss next steps toward implementation) was picked up by two blogs (From my bottom step and altlondon.org2) and the Londoner’s community listings (Benedict). Community listings are a small approximately 40-word free area for news postings (ibid). The meeting was not listed on familiar community engagement sites, such as SNAP London, Pillar, Emerging Leaders, etc. A City media release was issued on May 19th advertising the event (“Media Releases”). A further Google search of the terms “LSNS” or “London Strengthening Neighbourhood” to determine media exposure found only the articles listed above, London City documents and the May 19th City press release in the province of Ontario’s media release archives. Community associations not invited to participate in the original Task Force were invited to attend the May 25th Moving Forward meeting (Smith). This initial restriction of community association participation may have reduced public

acceptability as community organizations have their own information channels of distribution that were not originally accessed.

Another possible measure of public acceptability is City of London staff acceptance of the initiative. The researcher did not poll all City staff, but of the staff involved in LSNS (and who responded to the survey), the majority spent as much or less time as expected working with residents. And the majority of time spent, 83.3% was spent attending resident meetings. The City developed and implemented their own staff evaluation of the process (“Agenda”, Feb). The City of London’s staff evaluation report stated staff had a “greater understanding of what community engagement can be” (“Agenda”, Feb). Specifically one staff person declared, “The capacity of staff to lead and manage this process was astounding and a key learning for me on how community engagement should act and feel” (ibid). In broader terms of public acceptability, a total of 1,190 residents participated in the process, using 2006 London population statistics; this is 0.3% of the population (Statistics Canada). In essence, the LSNS is not supported outright by the media but it does have strong staff support and acceptance.

Turning now to the competence or the efficiency of engagement in LSNS, both outcome and process efficiency could be measured. In terms of process, the staff evaluation found “a greater connectivity between departments and divisions” (“Agenda”, Feb). Several London city staff departments collaborated on LSNS. According to the researcher’s staff survey results, 65% of staff respondents had worked with other departments frequently or very frequently before LSNS. Twenty-eight percent had never or infrequently worked with other departments and fourteen percent worked with other departments sometimes. According to the February 8th deputation to the Community and Protective Services Committee (CPSC), six different units of the City composed LSNS’s Internal Support Committee: Planning, Neighbourhood and Children’s Services (and Social and Community Support Services), Corporate Management, Environmental and Engineering Services, Parks and Recreation, and Corporate Communications
Thus inner organizational communication may have improved as a result of the process – a perhaps unexpected benefit that could have sustainable beneficial repercussions.

Continuing to analyze efficiency, it is notable that LSNS accomplished their four set objectives in a short eleven month time period (“Agenda”, Feb). Staff reportedly recognized that the process takes longer with residents but can be more creative as well (ibid). Hence much was accomplished in a short period of time. Resident Task Force expectations can be a gauge of the efficiency or competence of an engagement process as well. Residents of the Task Force noted their expectations of the engagement were met. The resident evaluation conducted by the City stated residents felt “well informed and empowered and felt valued because the meetings gave attention to time frames and was at all times run with respect for participant’s contributions” (“Agenda”, Feb). Although it also stated, “There was a real feeling that we need to keep the momentum going now that we have a plan.” (“Agenda”, Feb). Residents designed a 60 page, Five Year Strategy and Implementation Plan to implement their vision of City of London neighbourhoods (“Five Year Strategy”). This end result illustrates LSNS’s engagement competency.

In gauging the competence or efficiency of the outcomes of the engagement, one might examine the contents of the Five Year Strategy and Implementation Plan. (As the plan is not yet implemented in full, examining outcome efficiency may be unrealistic.) In essence, the plan is split into places and people (“Five Year Strategy” 2). People subcategories include engaged, connected, active, pride, empowered (ibid). The Place subcategories include sustainable, safe, services and activities, connectivity, parks, amenities and responsive city (ibid). These correspond with RTF’s vision of London neighbourhoods (“Five Year Strategy” 5). Several committees will apparently be formed to undertake strategy implementation, including: a Community Garden Steering Committee, a Walking Advisory Committee, a Fund Development Committee, Transition Town, and a Neighbourhood Action Group (“Five Year Strategy” 37-60). It is unclear exactly how the committees will be formed or whether RTF members will participate
on all these committees. It is assumed but not expressly stated that formation of these committees will occur in year one and actual implementation farther down the road (“Five Year Strategy” 39). There are a few minor items of interest in relation to strengthening neighbourhood policy in the strategy. For instance small businesses will receive support for all five years of the plan (“Five Year Strategy” 44). Community associations receive support for one year only (“Five Year Strategy” 37). As discussed earlier and exemplified in earlier case studies, neighbourhoods continue to need ongoing support post-initial policy implementation (“Final Reflections” 15). Community organizations may need further assistance building their networks to advocate for neighbourhood projects (“Final Reflections” 18). The LSNS differs from the aforementioned case studies in that agenda setting and actual implementation are separated. Visioning was step one. Implementation appears to be step two. It is unclear whether the same team that created the plan will execute implementation or retain accountability for it. Overall, however; the initial visioning stage engagement process was efficient. The plan was posted on the internet according to the City’s original deadlines. Looking ahead in detail at implementation and outcome efficiency is more confusing as it is still unclear how this will unfold. Thus there is some inefficiency in a lack of clarity over who is responsible to lead and account for implementation - the Task Force, the City or a new implementation team? Concerning accountability, there is one note of a yearly report card highlighting successes of LSNS strategies to be completed in year two (“Five Year Strategy” 59). This is a rather minimal accountability report.

Influence is the next community engagement typology component (Rowe and Frewer 262). Four City of London Directors sat on the Internal Support Committee of the LSNS: the Director of Land Use Planning, the Director of Parks and Recreation, the Director of Neighbourhood and Children’s Services and the Director of Environmental Programs and Solid Waste (“Agenda”, Feb). These four Directors and the General Manager, Neighbourhood and Children’s Services, were present for the community’s deputation to CPSC. All three General Managers of the city recommended and signed the resident’s plan, as per the February 8th agenda
document (ibid). Thus, from a municipal administration perspective, this initiative was certainly backed by the upper staff tier. The support of City politicians is unclear. One councillor sat on the LSNS (“Agenda”, Feb). But it is believed he did not sit on the LSNS in his role as a councillor (“Agenda”, Feb). The researcher attended the CPSC RTF presentation and it appeared councillors in attendance varied in degree of their support of the plan. One councillor suggested a subsequent meeting to gather more response, specifically more diverse responses. As it stands no councillor championed the process at the CPSC. Several commended the residents but typical of strengthening neighbourhood literature, the role of council with such initiatives is at times perhaps awkward (Taylor 86). Council must accommodate and adapt to a new role. They no longer represent the citizen but instead champion the process (ibid). Without a local LSNS champion accountability and perhaps interest in the initiative may be reduced. In general then, staff influence is high. Elected official influence is unclear.

Influence is also captured via money and technical expertise. Residents surveyed suggested more technology, for instance, some kind of sharing software be used to enhance the engagement process. This suggestion is perhaps difficult to implement as accessibility to internet and technical competence will vary among residents. Social media could, however; further connect residents and the outside community. LSNS was allotted no money or limited money initially. The City budgeted no departmental budget impacts in 2008 and 2009 for the Task Force work (“Report”, July 14, 2008). This limits available resources and capacity. Yet the Board of Control did recommend that $90,000 be provided to help move the 2010 first year implementation plans forward (“Agenda”, Feb.). The ANC initiatives demonstrated quick wins, ie. spending money on small successful projects early on can impact morale and momentum of residents (“Scarborough Village Sets a Good Example” 2). This did not occur with the RTF but will it occur early in the implementation? In strategic planning of organizations it can often cause challenges when frontline staff execute plans created by executives with little idea of frontline staff’s work (Swanstrom 145). Incongruence and apathy may result in implementation of LSNS’s
plan as evidenced in some similar strategic planning (execution) experiences (ibid). City staff appear to be responsible for upholding the vision and strategy during this stasis where the plan moves forward to implementation.

The final piece of Rowe and Frewer’s typology is transparency (262). Briefly the Five Year Strategy and Implementation plan is posted on the City of London website (“The heart and essence”). Residents presented the plan to the Community and Protective Services Committee on February 8, 2010 (“Agenda”). The plan was also discussed at the aforementioned Moving Forward meeting (Smith).

Summing up the LSNS community engagement through Rowe and Frewer’s lens, LSNS had some issues with representativeness in that all neighbourhoods did not participate. Some issues also surfaced around public acceptability in terms of poor media coverage and perhaps City council officials’ support. Overall LSNS was transparent, had municipal staff support, intended to be representative and democratic and was for the most part competent / efficient.

The following analysis will delve into each rung of Arnstein’s citizen participation ladder to correctly place LSNS community engagement on said ladder. Each rung is acknowledged in turn beginning with manipulation (2). According to Arnstein this rung inquires whether staff “educates, persuades and advises citizens or the reverse?” (5). Staff survey respondents felt they mainly facilitated the process and provided information. One staff member did feel the City led the process. Of resident respondents, 50% felt staff led the process. All residents said staff facilitated. According to City staff, residents were polled at the first meeting to determine who should facilitate RTF meetings (Smith). The three options provided included the following: City of London staff facilitating, RTF members facilitating or City of London staff and RTF members co-facilitating (Smith). Voting resulted in 69% of RTF members favouring City of London staff facilitation (ibid). Several RTF members did volunteer to facilitate the smaller working table discussions (Smith). Staff noted “all discussions, decisions and input were recorded by staff and/or RTF members” (ibid). Presentations at meetings were determined by RTF, ie. City staff
made a presentation on urban planning as per RTF request (Smith). Thus there is little evidence the city manipulated results and participation.

The next rung of Arnstein’s citizen participation ladder is therapy (2). Arnstein asks if there is evidence of insidious value adjustment for the benefit of the City (Arnstein 7). There is no real evidence of this in LSNS. Ninety-three percent of staff respondents said building capacity of residents to make positive change in their neighbourhoods was the objective in engaging residents with the program. Eighty-six percent also felt strengthening city ties to the community served a key objective. Staff noted residents brought several benefits to the process. Over 93% felt they brought passion and interest in the topic to the discussion. Seventy-nine percent also felt they brought new contacts for future community partnerships or programs. Staff did acknowledge that resident power struggles or conflict with other residents was a challenge. But there is no evidence of any therapy instituted to relieve this.

Informing is Arnstein’s subsequent rung (7). Informing refers to one-way only communication (ibid). Since RTF members’ soft data (survey interviews with other residents) was compiled and published in the LSNS Assessment report and subsequently posted on the city website, information was not one-way (“Neighbourhood Final Assessment Report” 61-90). According to resident respondents 45.5% felt the city always considered their input. Only 9% felt the city considered their input a little. RTF members also co-presented their final five Year Strategy and Implementation Plan to CPSC (“Agenda”, Feb.). Thus LSNS community engagement involved more than one-way information communication.

The placation stage is categorized by an ambiguous definition of citizen rights and responsibilities (Arnstein 9). Staff stated that roles and responsibilities were determined within the first two meetings (Smith). As already noted LSNS had four tasks to accomplish (created by staff), developing a vision, a neighbourhood assessment tool, etc. (“Agenda”, Feb.). Placation is typified by reliance on traditional solutions (Arnstein 11). RTF members sought out best practices of other communities in Canada and North America for their plan (“Five Year Strategy”
17). These best practices are listed next to London initiatives in the plan (ibid). For instance, one new solution to engaging people is to, “introduce a Youth Day at City Hall” where youth meet City politicians and staff (“Five Year Strategy” 11). Placation also arises when there is no assistance provided and insufficient information to make recommendations (Arnstein 10). Eighty-three percent of residents said staff provided information requested.

Thus far LSNS has processed smoothly through the nonparticipation and tokenism stages of citizen participation (Arnstein 4). The remaining rungs in hierarchical order compose the citizen power stage: partnership, delegated power and citizen control (ibid).

The partnership stage reflects shared power between citizens and power holders (Arnstein 11). Usually citizens here have some money and resources of their own and thus some “bargaining influence over the outcome of the plan” (Arnstein 11). Power appears to be shared in LSNS as roles and responsibilities were drafted in concert and break out meetings co-facilitated (Smith).

In moving forward and now further into the community, who will have the power? The City created the tasks for the LSNS, and the City seems to possess control over the money – albeit minimal, for the duration of the taskforce (“Report”, July 14). It appears from the outside to be the driving force- how will it now move forward? Will implementation continue to be partnership-oriented as more partners are involved (such as community organizations and businesses)?

The delegated power rung results in “citizens achieving dominant decision-making authority over a particular plan or program.” (Arnstein 13). CPSC approves or disproves the plan so LSNS has not achieved this level of participation. So overall it would seem LSNS rests in the citizen power stage, hovering around the partnership rung with unbalanced influence (weak to adequate financing, weak or untested pull with elected officials, solid commitment of staff), moderate public acceptability, democratic and transparent processes. The first visioning stage was efficient but there are efficiency questions arising moving forward.
Lastly, in commenting on LSNS and comparing it further one acknowledgement to be made is that the LSNS focus is on a city-wide strengthening neighbourhood strategy. The plan does include some targeted strategies (“Five Year Strategy” 41-42). For example, Clean and Green campaigns will target specific areas (“Five Year Strategy” 42). But the fact remains that many neighbourhoods have different issues. This is the case too in London, for instance in White Oaks, graffiti, vandalism and petty crime was the most frequently identified issue for residents surveyed (“Neighbourhood Assessment Final Report” 90). For Oakridge, traffic was one of the top issues (“Neighbourhood Assessment Final Report” 78). This is a reason representativeness is so important on the RTF and with strengthening neighbourhood engagement in general. Thus far the implementation strategy does not include a targeted response that involves participants from the concerned neighbourhoods.

Implications and Policy Recommendations

From the Minneapolis Neighbourhood Revitalization Program to the Victoria Jury Panel, to DSNI and Scarborough Village, all community engagement vehicles alike produced public acceptability. DSNI was esteemed by community organizations, business and the community. Scarborough Village’s public acceptability was acknowledged through the participation of agencies in the Agency Roundtable and the City of Toronto adopting the ANC model. Public acceptability though is not created on its own and is often impacted by representativeness and democracy. In DSNI’s case, influence, the monetary backing of the Riley Foundation and the representativeness of community participation in the engagement process positively affected public acceptability. In Scarborough Village public acceptability probably arose from respected representative animators, language translation and a democratic process that built trust. In the City of London’s case public acceptability is questionable in terms of broad appeal or avowal from the general public but the RTF and municipal staff held the program in esteem.
It is difficult to say which one component of the community engagement process is more important than the other. All organizations (while deemed rather effective with their community engagement process) attempted to produce a democratic (open) representative process. When a process is democratic, transparency often flows or follows and can in turn positively impact public acceptability. Competence and efficiency likewise are affected by all the above. Influence is perhaps the only variable that is somewhat separate and not interconnected from the other components. JRF struggled with weak influence in terms of staff training and resources, time and money and thus some organizations did fail. Thus sustainable strengthening neighbourhood initiatives might need to harness funding and other such resources before commencing engagement.

Going forward, the City of London has a tough task. It probably hopes to maintain resident momentum to implement its Task Force strategy. Unlike the preponderance of other cases noted here community engagement in LSNS is possibly the only case that did not involve community based organizations early on in the process. It will be interesting to see what the impact is. The LSNS Five Year Strategy and Implementation Report calls for community organization assistance with many strategy action steps. One might assume further time will be spent bringing these organizations on board in order to access these needed resources. These organizations may have some different solutions to issues in their neighbourhood. One benefit of engagement is tackling apathy – when participants own the ideas, apathy fades (Wilcox et al. 3). Community organizations did not share in this. The City may need to be flexible in revisiting its strategy to accommodate organizational concerns. At the same time, as noted in some JRF cases, not all community organizations reflect concerns of their residents – thus bringing community organizations on board will prove interesting as City staff and/or residents negotiate between real neighbourhood concerns and agency issues.

The City of London appears set to proceed with the LSNS incognito so to speak, without major publicity or recognition. Unlike with ANC, no known block parties or celebrations
occurred to announce the strategy or celebrate its successful creation. Absence of exposure (via media, etc.) could impact future transparency. Or it could also be part of a larger problem whereby city residents are not aware or adequately informed of issues local government is addressing (in their own neighbourhoods). LSNS may need to find more creative avenues of communication, such as social media to distribute their message. Perhaps public acceptability and transparency will increase as businesses and local community organizations are pulled into the implementation of the plan. These groups often possess supplemental communication networks and may have the capacity to distribute information to previously unconnected areas. Similarly the lack of apparent celebrations of success may in the future affect citizen ownership and pride in the process (“Scarborough Village Sets a Good Example” 4). Will the low profile, few resources, mixed influence and public acceptability affect citizen participation on the subcommittees working on implementation? Will they be given a budget and decision-making authority? Looking forward one can recognize the usefulness of using Rowe and Frewer and Arnstein’s typology of citizen participation before commencing the engagement process. Although usage does not guarantee community engagement success it does provide a defense of the process to politicians at local, provincial and federal levels. It may ensure citizens a voice that is not tokenistic. It can be a checklist of sorts for structuring a community engagement process.

**Conclusion**

The purpose of the paper is to examine community engagement processes in strengthening neighbourhood experiences to determine which components are intrinsic to community engagement’s effectiveness. The framework or lens through which engagement was viewed was Arnstein’s ladder of citizen participation and Rowe and Frewer’s Typology of Public Engagement Mechanisms. Each neighbourhood is different and each community engagement process accordingly had different visions or agreement of meaning on what was effective. Most
case studies reviewed pegged engagement in the citizen power stage of Arnstein’s ladder – either partnering, delegating power or citizens controlling it. Thus effective engagement was genuine and not rubber stamped or self-interested on the part of the exercise sponsor. For example animators in Scarborough Village already had the trust of their individual communities (“Toronto”). Their participation and position in the engagement process strengthened the trust of these residents in the engagement process in general. This is a key finding perhaps for community engagement initiators going forward. Recruit marginalized groups; they can be mobilized to produce effective results. Also of note is city staff’s response to community engagement participants and processes. Staff differed individually in dealing with residents and thereby in aiding or obstructing capacity building. Moving forward all city staff need to be on board with strengthening neighbourhood initiatives or they prevent the very solutions they work for everyday. London staff was quite accommodating to residents but this is only the planning stage. Initiators of community engagement are best to be strategic when developing their engagement process plan as different components are more important to different communities. Representativeness was crucial for some areas, influence and resources for others. This differential makes sense as literature notes each neighbourhood is different. Community engagement processes thus can not be exactly the same.
Works Cited


<http://lithgow-schmidt.dk/sherry-arnstein/ladder-of-citizen-participation.html>


<http://www.london.ca/About_London/infomedway_nopics.htm>


City of London. “The heart and essence of every community is its neighbourhoods.”


Fröding, K., C. Eriksson, and I. Elander. "Partnership for Healthy Neighbourhoods –
City Networking in Multilevel Context." *European Urban and Regional Studies* 
10 Feb. 2010.


http://www.caledoninst.org/Publications/PDF/629ENG.pdf


Smith, Cheryl. “LSNS”. Responses to researcher questions. 18 June 2010. E-mail.


Appendix One: Map of City of London Neighbourhoods

Appendix Two: London Strengthening Neighbourhood Strategy

Staff Survey

1. How did you recruit resident volunteers? Please check all that apply:
   a) City website
   b) Pamphlets in resident mailboxes, libraries, etc.
   c) Newspaper
   d) Radio, other media
   e) Through staff at community organizations, neighbourhood associations: please state:
   f) Through staff at cultural associations
   g) Other ____________

2. How much time on average per week did you spend with residents on this initiative?
   a) Zero to 4 hours
   b) 5 to 9 hours
   c) 10 to 20 hours
   d) More than 20 hours
   e) Other. Please explain:

3. How much time did you expect to spend working with residents?
   a) Zero to 4 hours
   b) 5 to 9 hours
   c) 10 to 20 hours
   d) More than 20 hours
   e) No expectations

4. How did you feel you spent most of your time on the LSNS?
   a) Attending resident meetings
   b) Attending department meetings
   c) Attending inter-department meetings
   d) Answering questions, finding information for residents
   e) Facilitating discussions between residents
   f) Dealing with conflicts among residents
   g) Other. Please explain:

5. Did you work with other City of London departments on this?
   a) Yes. Please name the departments:
   b) No. Please skip to question 7.

6. If yes, had you worked with them before?
   a) Yes, very frequently
   b) Frequently
   c) Sometimes
   d) Infrequently
7. What were some benefits you feel residents brought to the LSNS? Please check all that apply:

a) Knowledge of the neighbourhood
b) Passion and interest in the topic
c) Work expertise (lawyer, corporation CEO, etc.)
d) New contacts for future community partnerships or programs
e) Different socio-economic perspectives (ie. different cultural or economic perspectives)
f) Other: __________

8. What were some of the challenges of involving residents in this type of community engagement process? Please check all that apply:

a) Resident power struggles/ conflict with other residents
b) Unrealistic demands regarding funding, program outcomes
c) High demands of staff
d) Residents (unknowingly to staff) asking many different staff to do the same task
e) Other: __________

9. What were your objectives in engaging residents with this program (for this stage of the program)?

a) Strengthening city ties to the community
b) Enhancing resident views of the city
c) Building capacity of residents to make positive change in their neighbourhoods
d) For the City of London to be a leader in Strengthening neighbourhood initiatives in Ontario
e) Other: __________

10. Do you feel these objectives were met?

a) Yes
b) No
c) Other: __________

11. What changes, if any, would you make if you could do the process over?

12. Do you feel your role overall in your perspective (or as per residents) was mainly

a) Informational
b) Leader
c) Facilitator
d) Problem-solver
e) Other. Please explain:

13. Have you read the Five Year Strategy and Implementation plan?
14. Are you satisfied with the Implementation plan?
   a) Very satisfied
   b) Satisfied
   c) Somewhat satisfied
   d) Unsatisfied
   e) Very unsatisfied
   f) Other. Please explain:

15. Were you involved in the entire Task Force process from beginning to end?

Please tell me a bit about yourself by responding to the following questions. (These questions are optional)

   Name of Department: ______
   Number of years in your position: ___
Appendix Three: London Strengthening Neighbourhood Strategy

Resident Survey

1. How did you hear about London’s Strengthening Neighbourhood Strategy (LSNS)?
   a) Heard about it from a community organization
   b) Heard about it from city (council or staff)
   c) Saw an advertisement recruiting volunteers
   d) Heard about it from friends or neighbours
   e) Other. Please state: __________

2. What were the main reasons you decided to volunteer? Please check all that apply:
   a) Social reasons; meet new people
   b) Concern over neighbourhood issues
   c) Learn new skills
   d) Interest in city government
   e) Other. Please state: __________

3. What were your objectives in participating in the LSNS?
   a) Solve a particular neighbourhood problem
   b) Change a council policy
   c) Build a stronger neighbourhood
   d) Job contacts
   e) Other. Please state:

4. Were these expectations met?
   a) Yes
   b) Somewhat
   c) No
   d) Other __

5. How many neighbourhood taskforce meetings on average did you attend?

6. What changes, if any, would you make to the overall process?

7. What was the City of London’s role in the LSNS process? Please check all that apply.
   a) Information – they provided the information we asked for
   b) Leader – they set the tone, made the agenda, made overall goals
   c) Problem solver – they resolved conflict
   d) Facilitator – they supported us when needed and helped the process run smoothly
   e) Other. Please explain:
8. Do you feel the process was accessible (ie. was it easy to participate, attend meetings, etc.)
   a) Yes
   b) Sometimes
   c) No
   d) Other. Please explain:

9. How often do you feel your input was generally considered by the City?
   a) Never
   b) A little
   c) A moderate amount
   d) A lot
   e) A very great deal
   f) Always
   g) Other. Please explain:

10. What was the best part of participating in the LSNS?

11. What was your least favourite part of participating in the LSNS?

12. Have you volunteered before?:
   a) Yes, with the City of London (on political campaigns, city boards, other task forces or advisory committees)
   b) Yes, with community organizations (such as neighbourhood associations or non-profit organizations)
   c) No
   d) Other

13. Would you volunteer with the City of London again?
   a) Yes
   b) Maybe
   c) No

14. Have you read the Five Year Strategy and Implementation Plan?

Please tell me a little about yourself by responding to the following questions. (These questions are optional)

Length of time living in your current neighbourhood: ___________
What is your postal code: ___________
What is your current age?:
   a) 20 – 30
   b) 31-40
c) 41-50  
  d) 51-60  
  e) 60 or wiser

Are you a member of a recognized minority (visible minority, a person with a disability)?

Please indicate immediate family income range:
  a) Less than $30,000
  b) $30,000 - $50,000
  c) Over $50,000

What is your gender?:
  a) Male
  b) Female